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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRODUCT AND VENTURES

INTERNATIONAL,

PLAINTIFF,

NO. C-16-0669 YGR

VS.

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2016

AXUS STATIONARY (SHANGHAI)

LTD., ET AL.,

MOTION TO DISMISS

DEFENDANTS.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, JUDGE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF: GAW | POE LLP

4 EMBARCADERO CENTER, SUITE 1400 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111

BY: SAMUEL SONG, ESQUIRE

FOR DEFENDANTS: HOGAN LOVELLS

3 EMBARCADERO CENTER, SUITE 1500 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111 BY: MICHELLE ALBORZFAR, ESQUIRE

REPORTED BY: DIANE E. SKILLMAN, CSR 4909, RPR, FCRR

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1 TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2016 3:35 P.M. 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 THE CLERK: WE WILL DO THE PRODUCTS AND VENTURES INTERNATIONAL VERSUS AXUS STATIONARY. 4 5 CALLING CIVIL ACTION 16-669 PRODUCTS AND VENTURES INTERNATIONAL VERSUS AXUS STATIONARY. 6 7 COUNSEL, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEARANCES. 8 MR. SONG: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. SAMUEL SONG 9 FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 10 MS. ALBORZFAR: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. MICHELLE 11 ALBORZFAR FOR THE MOVING DEFENDANTS. THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON. I NEED TO GRAB YOUR FILE 12 13 REAL OUICK. I WILL BE RIGHT BACK. 14 (PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS.) 15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S BEGIN. 16 HOW DO I PRONOUNCE YOUR NAME? 17 MS. ALBORZFAR: ALBORZFAR. THE COURT: WE'LL START WITH YOU. 18 19 GO AHEAD. 20 MS. ALBORZFAR: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 21 WE MOVED TO DISMISS THIS CASE BECAUSE THE -- WE BELIEVE 22 THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SATISFY THE BASIC PROCEDURAL 23 REQUIREMENTS TO ALLEGE AND MAINTAIN CLAIMS IN THIS COURT. AND 24 THE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO OUR MOTION IS THAT MY CLIENTS ARE 25 ATTEMPTING TO EVADE LIABILITY AND GET THIS CASE GOING ON THE

MERITS BASED ON MERE TECHNICALITIES.

AND WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT DOWN THE ROAD THEY WILL BE

UNABLE TO SHOW LIABILITY IN ANY EVENT, YOUR HONOR, DUE PROCESS

IS NOT A MERE TECHNICALITY AND NEITHER ARE THE REQUIREMENTS

AND THE RULES GOVERNING CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND CONTRACT

LIABILITY. THOSE RULES ARE THERE FOR A REASON, AND THE

PLAINTIFF IS ATTEMPTING TO ARGUE THAT THOSE RULES SHOULD NOT

APPLY TO THEM WITHOUT ANY BASIS FOR DOING SO.

THE COURT: WELL, THERE'S NOT NO BASIS. SO FOCUS ON THE FACTS.

MS. ALBORZFAR: YES, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: FOCUS ON THE ALLEGATIONS. I MEAN THAT'S -- THAT'S WHAT I HAVE TO LOOK AT. RIGHT?

THERE IS A TEST, AND I NEED TO LOOK AT EVERY COMPONENT OF
THAT TEST AND DECIDE WHICH WEIGH IN FAVOR OF JURISDICTION AND
WHICH DO NOT. AND THE ALLEGATION HERE IS THAT YOU HAVE ONE
DEFENDANT WHO ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT HERE IN CALIFORNIA THAT
HAD A CLAUSE WHERE THERE WAS JURISDICTION AND THAT OTHER
DEFENDANTS ARE EFFECTIVELY THE ALTER EGO. THAT'S THE ISSUE.
SO IT'S NOT AS IF THERE'S NO BASIS.

MS. ALBORZFAR: YOUR HONOR, THE CONTRACT ON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF ARGUES THAT THERE WAS A CONSENT TO JURISDICTION IS A CONTRACT THAT, AS YOU RECOGNIZED, EIGHT OF THE NINE NAMED DEFENDANTS AND NONE OF THE SPECIALLY—APPEARING DEFENDANTS ACTUALLY ENTERED INTO.

ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS IS THAT THE CONTRACT
WAS ENTERED INTO BY NOT ONLY THE NAMED PARTIES BUT ALSO
SUBSIDIARIES AND RELATED ENTITIES OF THOSE PARTIES.

BUT IF YOUR HONOR LOOKS AT THE FIRST PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE, WHICH IS EXHIBIT 1 TO THE COMPLAINT, IT STATES THAT THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN MARCO TRADING COMPANY AND SHANGHAI MARCO STATIONARY COMPANY LIMITED AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES OR OTHER RELATED COMPANIES. BUT DIRECTLY AFTER THAT CLAUSE, THERE'S A SPECIFIC CLAUSE THAT DEFINES MARCO TRADING COMPANY -- EXCUSE ME. DEFINES MARCO -- SHANGHAI MARCO AS INCLUDING ONLY SHANGHAI MARCO AND MARCO TRADING COMPANY.

AND THOSE ARE THE ENTITIES THAT ARE REFERRED TO THROUGHOUT THE AGREEMENT. THE REST OF THE AGREEMENT, EVERY TIME THAT AN OBLIGATION APPEARS, THE OBLIGATION IS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SHANGHAI MARCO. AND SHANGHAI MARCO WAS SPECIFICALLY DEFINED TO ONLY INCLUDE THE TWO ENTITIES OF SHANGHAI MARCO —

THE COURT: SLOW DOWN.

MS. ALBORZFAR: YES, YOUR HONOR. I'M SORRY.

SHANGHAI MARCO AND MARCO TRADING COMPANY. SECTION 15 OF
THE AGREEMENT IS THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISION, AND THAT'S
THE SECTION THAT INCLUDES THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE ON WHICH
THE PLAINTIFF ARGUES CONFERS JURISDICTION HERE ON
NON-CONTRACTING PARTIES.

SECTION 15, THE VERY FIRST SENTENCE STATES: IF A DISPUTE

OR COMPLAINT ARISES CONCERNING THIS AGREEMENT, SHANGHAI MARCO
AND PVI WILL NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE, AND GOES
ON TO TALK ABOUT THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES THAT ARE
REQUIRED.

THIS PROVISION SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES SHANGHAI MARCO AND PVI. AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, SHANGHAI MARCO IS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT AS INCLUDING --

THE COURT: YOU ARE MISSING THE POINT. I GET THE SIMPLE. THAT'S NOT WHERE THE ANALYSIS HAPPENS. SO YOU CAN EITHER REGURGITATE THE OBVIOUS AND I WILL MOVE ON TO THE PLAINTIFF, OR YOU CAN ATTEMPT TO INFORM THE ANALYSIS ON WHAT'S MORE COMPLICATED, WHICH IS, EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS AFTER THE FACT WHICH IS BEING ARGUED BY IMPLICATION IS THE GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION.

SO DO YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THE MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE OR SHALL I ASK FOR COMMENTS BY MR. SONG?

MS. ALBORZFAR: YES, YOUR HONOR. I WILL ADDRESS THE NEXT PLAINTIFF'S ALTER EGO LIABILITY ALLEGATIONS.

THE PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ASSERT ALTER EGO
LIABILITY, THEY HAVE TO MEET TWO REQUIREMENTS. THE FIRST
REQUIREMENT IS THAT THERE IS A UNITY OF INTEREST AMONGST THE
VARIOUS DEFENDANTS. AND IN THIS CASE, THE PLAINTIFF RELIES ON
ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE
PROFFERED IN OUR PAPERS, AND ON A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
PERSONAL JURISDICTION GROUNDS, THE COURT IS ENTITLED TO RELY

ON THAT EVIDENCE.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES THAT THERE IS -- THERE
WERE TRANSFERS OF ASSETS AMONG THE VARIOUS DEFENDANTS AND THAT
THE DEFENDANTS COMMINGLE ASSETS WITH ONE ANOTHER. AND THERE'S
EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF YOUR HONOR THAT SHOWS THAT THOSE
ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT TRUE AND THAT EVIDENCE IS -- THAT EVIDENCE
MAY BE CONSIDERED ON A MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

BUT THE SECOND PRONG OF THE ALTER EGO ANALYSIS IS REALLY
WHERE THE PROBLEM LIES. THERE, THE PLAINTIFF HAS TO SHOW THAT
AN INEQUITABLE RESULT WILL OCCUR IF THE COURT DISREGARDS —
DOES NOT DISREGARD THE CORPORATE VEIL. AND HERE, THE ONLY
ALLEGATION THAT PVI CAN ASSERT IS THAT IF THE COURT DOESN'T
PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL, IT DOESN'T BELIEVE IT WILL BE ABLE
TO RECOVER FROM SHANGHAI MARCO.

AND THIS COURT HAS SPECIFICALLY FOUND IN PRIOR CASE LAW
THAT THAT'S NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR SHOWING AN INEQUITABLE
RESULT UNDER ALTER EGO LIABILITY. AND, IN FACT, HERE, THE
PLAINTIFF HAS NAMED SHANGHAI MARCO AS A DEFENDANT IN THIS
CASE. SO OBVIOUSLY THE PLAINTIFF BELIEVES THAT THERE'S SOME
MERIT TO SUING SHANGHAI MARCO IN THE CASE.

THE RULE THAT YOUR HONOR HAS ARTICULATED IN PRIOR CASE LAW
IS IMPORTANT AND IT'S FOR A GOOD REASON. AND THE REASON IS,
IF WE ADOPTED THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY, THEN ANY TIME THE
PLAINTIFF COULD CONCEIVE OF A POSSIBLE SCENARIO IN WHICH THE

PARTY THAT IT ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT WITH MIGHT NOT BE --1 2 THEY MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO RECOVER FROM THAT DEFENDANT, THE 3 PLAINTIFF COULD NAME IN LITIGATION ANY ENTITY, ANY PERSON WHO IT CAN ALLEGE HAS ANY CONCEIVABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 4 5 CONTRACTING PARTY. AND THAT'S NOT THE LAW. THAT'S NOT THE 6 STANDARD. 7 THE COURT: SO SHOULD I ALLOW DISCOVERY, 8 JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY? 9 MS. ALBORZFAR: WE DON'T BELIEVE, YOUR HONOR, THAT 10 THERE IS A SUFFICIENT BASIS ALLEGED FOR JURISDICTION, BUT IF 11 YOUR HONOR HAS ANY DOUBT ABOUT THAT, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT, 12 YES, JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY WOULD BE THE PREFERRED COURSE OF 13 ACTION INSTEAD OF ASSERTING JURISDICTION WHERE WE MIGHT LATER 14 DISCOVER THAT NONE EXISTED. 15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. RESPONSE. 16 MR. SONG: SO IT SOUNDS LIKE THE COURT IS INTERESTED 17 IN THE ALTER EGO ALLEGATIONS. THE COURT: AND I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE ANY -- YOU 18 19 CERTAINLY DON'T MEET ANY TEST FOR DIRECT JURISDICTION. 20 MR. SONG: WELL --21 THE COURT: WITH RESPECT TO THESE ENTITIES THAT HAVE 22 NO TIES OR CONNECTIONS TO CALIFORNIA, EITHER GENERALLY OR 23 SPECIFICALLY. IT'S THE ONLY HOOK YOU HAVE IS THAT CONTRACT. 24 MR. SONG: I DON'T NECESSARILY AGREE. I THINK AS

WE'VE ARGUED, EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS IS AN EXPRESS PARTY TO

THE CONTRACT. THE CONTRACT ON THE FIRST PAGE SAYS THAT THE

PARTIES INCLUDE SHANGHAI MARCO, MARCO TRADING COMPANY, AND ALL

RELATED COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES.

IN ADDITION TO THAT FIRST PARAGRAPH, THERE IS

PARAGRAPH 18B OF THE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT WHICH STATES THAT

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE REGARDLESS OF CHANGES IN

NAME, OWNERSHIP, LEGAL STATUS, OR LOCATION OF SHANGHAI MARCO,

ITS PARENT COMPANY, OR ITS SUBSIDIARIES.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE IS SHANGHAI MARCO CAME FIRST,
WE BELIEVE, AND THEN THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, MR. VIEGAS AND
MR. XU, CREATED ALL OF THESE OTHER COMPANIES. EXACTLY WHY, WE
DON'T KNOW. WE BELIEVE IT WAS FOR SOME IMPROPER PURPOSE.

AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT THESE OTHER COMPANIES,

NAMELY, SHANGHAI LAIKESHENG AND LATER AXUS STATIONARY ASSUMED

THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT FROM SHANGHAI

MARCO. SO WE'VE ARGUED THAT THE OTHER DEFENDANTS ARE EXPRESS

PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT.

IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THERE ARE
TWO PRETTY STRAIGHTFORWARD THEORIES FOR THE COURT'S FINDING OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE. ONE WOULD BE CONSENT AND
TWO WOULD BE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION UNDER PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
ANALYSIS.

ON THE ISSUE OF CONSENT, WE FEEL THAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAW ON THIS AREA IS PRETTY CLEAR. THERE'S MANETTI-FARROW

WHICH HELD THAT FEDERAL LAW APPLIES IN EVALUATING A FORUM

SELECTION CLAUSE. THERE'S ALSO THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE IN CHAN WHICH HELD THAT AGREEING OR CONSENTING TO A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE AMOUNTS TO A CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THAT PARTICULAR VENUE.

IN TERMS OF IMPUTING THE CONSENT TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTS,
OTHER THAN SHANGHAI MARCO, THERE ARE THREE ALTERNATIVE WAYS
THE COURT CAN FIND THAT IMPUTATION. ONE IS THE THEORY THAT I

JUST DISCUSSED, THAT ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS ARE EXPRESS PARTIES
TO THE CONTRACT. ANOTHER THEORY IS ONE DISCUSSED IN

MANETTI-FARROW AS WELL, AND ALSO JUDGE ALSUP'S DECISION

ULTRATECH. AND THAT THEORY IS THAT EVEN IF SOME OF THE

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT EXPRESS PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT, THEY ARE
BOUND BECAUSE THE CLAIMS AGAINST THEM ARE QUOTE "CLOSELY

RELATED" END QUOTE TO THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

I WOULD URGE THE COURT TO TAKE A LOOK AT ULTRATECH. IT'S

A PRETTY STRAIGHTFORWARD APPLICATION OF THAT RULE.

(JUDGE SNEEZED.)

MR. SONG: BLESS YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: THANK YOU. GO AHEAD.

MR. SONG: THE ALTER EGO ALLEGATIONS -- NOT ONLY THE ALLEGATIONS BUT ALSO THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE AFFIDAVITS,

THOSE PROVIDE A THIRD ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR IMPUTING CONSENT

TO ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION --

(JUDGE SNEEZED.)

MR. SONG: BLESS YOU, YOUR HONOR. I HOPE YOU ARE NOT

ALLERGIC TO ME.

THE COURT: NO. IT'S JUST BEEN A LONG DAY.

GO AHEAD.

MR. SONG: OKAY. AS TO THE ALTER EGO ALLEGATIONS

THEMSELVES, WE BELIEVE THAT WE'VE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED AND SET

FORTH ADDITIONAL FACTS IN THE AFFIDAVITS.

I THINK THE CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE HELD THAT EVEN PLEADING

JUST ONE FACTOR, FOR EXAMPLE, SOLE OWNERSHIP IS ENOUGH TO

ESTABLISH THE FIRST PRONG OF ALTER EGO, WHICH IS UNITY OF

INTEREST. AND I BELIEVE WE SET FORTH PLENTY OF FACTS

DEMONSTRATING SOLE OWNERSHIP BY MR. VIEGAS AND MR. XU OVER ALL

OF THE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE.

AS TO THE INEQUITABLE RESULT, WE DID ARGUE THAT BECAUSE SHANGHAI MARCO WAS DISSOLVED IN 2013, THE PROBLEM, IF THE COURT DOES NOT PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL, IS THAT THEN DEFENDANTS COULD POTENTIALLY AVOID LIABILITY COMPLETELY. AND AS THE DEFENDANTS POINTED OUT, THAT'S SOMETHING THAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST AND AXON, THE CASE THAT WE CITED, DEALT WITH SOMETHING THAT HAPPENED AFTER — AFTER THE RELEVANT LAWSUIT WAS FILED.

IN THE DECLARATION THAT WE SUBMITTED, THE DECLARATION OF

JULIAN RUSSELL -- JULIAN RUSSELL IS PLAINTIFF'S CORPORATE

INVESTIGATOR -- HE DISCOVERED THAT STARTING IN FEBRUARY OF

THIS YEAR AFTER THIS ACTION WAS FILED THAT MR. VIEGAS AND

MR. XU, BOTH DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION, BEGAN TO DEREGISTER

SOME OF THEIR COMPANIES, INCLUDING ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS NAMED IN THIS ACTION. THAT'S KENPARK.

THIS SUGGESTS TO US THAT THIS DISSOLVING OF SOME OF THE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS IS ... MAY BE AN EFFORT TO AVOID LIABILITY IN THIS CASE. IT'S NOT JUST AN ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF WON'T BE ABLE TO RECOVER THEIR LOSSES; IT'S AN ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE TRYING TO AVOID LIABILITY COMPLETELY. SO WE BELIEVE THAT CLEARLY ESTABLISHES AN INEQUITABLE RESULT JUSTIFYING THE APPLICATION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE.

JUST A COUPLE OF POINTS I WANTED TO ADDRESS AT FIRST.

DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL SAID THAT -- ON THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION

ISSUE THAT FACTS PRESENTED IN A DECLARATION THEY SUBMITTED

WITH THEIR REPLY BRIEF BY MR. VIEGAS CONTRADICTS PLAINTIFF'S

FACTUAL SHOWING. WELL, THE NINTH CIRCUIT STANDARD IS, IF

THERE ARE FACTUAL DISPUTES IN THE AFFIDAVITS, THOSE DISPUTES

MUST BE WEIGHED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. SO IT'S NOT -- THE

TIE GOES TO THE PLAINTIFF.

SO IT'S -- IT'S INEFFECTUAL TO TRY TO CREATE THIS FACTUAL DISPUTE BY SUBMITTING ANOTHER DECLARATION WITH THE REPLY BRIEF.

THE COURT: AND YOUR PERSPECTIVE ON JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY?

MR. SONG: OH. WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE COURT IS -HAS FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER JURISDICTION IS PROPER IN

THIS CASE, WE WOULD -- YEAH, WE WOULD ASK FOR JURISDICTIONAL 1 2 DISCOVERY. AND THE DEFENDANTS AGREE. 3 THE COURT: WELL, I THINK GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS THAT I HAVE, WHEN I LOOK AT THE TEST 4 5 I DO HAVE TO DO SOME WEIGHING AND SOME BALANCING, AND UNFORTUNATELY I DON'T THINK I HAVE ENOUGH TO DO THAT GIVEN THE 6 7 CURRENT STATE OF THE RECORD. SO I DO THINK THAT 8 JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IS APPROPRIATE. THERE ARE SOME FACTORS WHICH WEIGH IN FAVOR OF BOTH SIDES, 9 AND I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEFENDANTS SEEKING TO 10 11 MANUFACTURE, IF THAT'S WHAT IT IS, CORPORATE ENTITIES TO AVOID 12 LIABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE CONCERNS ABOUT 13 HAULING SOMEONE IN FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY WHO SHOULDN'T BE 14 HERE IN THE FIRST PLACE. 15 SO UNTIL I HAVE A BETTER GRASP OF WHAT IS THERE, I THINK 16 THAT THIS IS BETTER LEFT FOR A DAY IN THE FUTURE. AND I KNOW 17 THAT, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO -- WE ARE STILL GOING THROUGH 18 THE HAGUE CONVENTION, I THINK, RIGHT? 19 MR. SONG: THAT'S CORRECT AS TO SOME OF THE UNSERVED 20 DEFENDANTS. 21 THE COURT: ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS. SO I AM GOING TO 22 ORDER JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY. 23 HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU NEED? 24 MR. SONG: IT WOULD DEPEND IN PART ON HOW COOPERATIVE

THE DEFENDANTS ARE. BUT PRELIMINARILY I THINK WE WOULD ASK

FOR THREE MONTHS IF THAT SOUNDS REASONABLE TO YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO I THINK -- I WILL ORDER JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT SO THAT I KNOW WHAT IT IS YOU HAVE.

SO THE MOTION IS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND EXCEPT THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED. THE MOTIONS TO STRIKE ARE RARELY, IF EVER, GRANTED. AND THE PROFFER MADE BY THE DEFENSE TO STRIKE PARAGRAPH 36, THE SECOND SENTENCE OF 41 BECAUSE THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION, OR AT LEAST ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT DOESN'T FRANKLY LIKE, IS NOT A BASIS FOR A RULE 12 (F) MOTION. SO THAT MOTION IS DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. I DON'T WANT TO SEE IT AGAIN. ALL RIGHT?

MS. ALBORZFAR: UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WHAT I WILL EXPECT THEN, IF I GIVE YOU

THE SUMMER TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY, I'LL PUT YOU ON -- I'LL ORDER

THAT YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT BE FILED BY SEPTEMBER 6TH. AND

THEN WE MAY GO THROUGH ANOTHER ROUND OF BRIEFING, BUT AT LEAST

I WILL HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY.

MR. SONG: YES, YOUR HONOR.

NOT TO BELABOR THE ISSUE, BUT JUST SO WE CAN CRAFT A

BETTER COMPLAINT FOR YOUR HONOR, IS YOUR HONOR CONCERNED WITH

THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS ITSELF OR RATHER THE

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS WHO AREN'T SHANGHAI MARCO OR

BOTH?

THE COURT: PRIMARILY THE LATTER.

MR. SONG: THE CONNECTION.

THE COURT: I THINK THAT IT IS A HARD SELL, ALTHOUGH
I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENT, I THINK IT'S A HARD SELL GIVEN THE
WEIGHING THAT I NEED TO DO TO BRING IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION ON THE BASIS OF A GENERIC CLAUSE THAT ATTACHES TO
THE PRIMARY SIGNER OF THE CONTRACT. SO I JUST NEED, I NEED
MORE. I NEED TO UNDERSTAND THOSE RELATIONSHIPS MORE, AND
WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF THESE ENTITIES HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH
THIS CONTRACT. I MEAN, IF THEY HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE
CONTRACT, THAT MAKES A STRONGER CASE.

MR. SONG: I BELIEVE WE DO ALLEGE THAT, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DEFENDANT KENPARK RECEIVED COMMISSION PAYMENTS IN DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT.

IN ADDITION, AXUS HONG KONG WAS A SUBSIDIARY OF AXUS

STATIONARY. AXUS STATIONARY, WE ALLEGE, DIRECTLY ASSUMED THE

OBLIGATIONS -- THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION

AGREEMENT. THESE ARE DIRECT CONNECTIONS TO SHANGHAI MARCO,

YOUR HONOR.

AND I UNDERSTAND YOUR HONOR'S CONCERN. THIS IS AN UNUSUAL CASE WHERE WE'VE GOT SEVEN CORPORATE ENTITIES, BUT I THINK IT'S WORTH REMEMBERING THAT WE'RE DEALING WITH CHINESE CORPORATIONS. NOT THAT THERE'S ANYTHING INHERENTLY WRONG WITH CHINESE CORPORATIONS, BUT THINGS ARE DONE DIFFERENTLY OVER THERE.

IN THE UNITED STATES, YOU DON'T SEE THIS MANY RELATED

CORPORATE ENTITIES CREATED WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY RELATED, ARE

UNDER ONE UMBRELLA. IN CHINA, I BELIEVE, MY UNDERSTANDING IS

THAT THE LAWS ARE A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT. IN FACT, THERE ARE

SOME LAWS THAT SORT OF ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF THESE RELATED

ENTITIES ESPECIALLY IN A SITUATION WHERE YOU HAVE A PERSON

FROM OUTSIDE OF CHINA COMING INTO CHINA AND CREATING

BUSINESSES.

SO THERE'S THIS -- IT'S JUST A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT OVER
THERE. THAT'S WHAT I AM SAYING. SO I UNDERSTAND THAT IT'S A
LITTLE BIT UNUSUAL, BUT --

THE COURT: ALL OF THAT CAN BE ALLEGED. IT CAN. I

MEAN I HAVE THE FIRST -- YOU'VE BEEN SITTING IN HERE ALL DAY.

THE FIRST CASE THAT I HAD WAS AN MDL THAT INVOLVES A NUMBER OF

ASIAN COMPANIES AS WELL. WE'VE GOT SONY, PANASONIC, TOSHIBA,

LIKE 18 DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THE NAMED DEFENDANTS HAVE

MULTIPLE ENTITIES. AND THE WAY THEY DO THINGS OVER THERE

DIFFERS. RIGHT?

SO YOU TAKE AN ANTITRUST CASE AND YOU OVERLAY THE
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE STRUCTURE. BUT THAT
CAN BE ALLEGED. AND AT LEAST THAT PART OF IT HAS NOT BEEN
ALLEGED.

SO IF YOU HAVE A PERSPECTIVE IN MIND ABOUT WHY IT IS THAT

THESE ARE RELATED, EVEN IF IT'S IN PART ON YOUR -- OR YOUR

CLIENT'S VIEW OF HOW THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE OPERATES OVER

THERE, WELL THEN ALLEGE IT. I DON'T HAVE THAT IN FRONT OF ME. 1 2 MR. SONG: UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR. 3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT? AND AFTER THE NEXT ROUND WHEN I HAVE MORE, THEN I CAN DO A 4 MORE COMPREHENSIVE ORDER AND IF WE NEED TO GO ANOTHER ROUND, 5 6 WE WILL GO ANOTHER ROUND. 7 MR. SONG: LET'S HOPE NOT. 8 MS. ALBORZFAR: YOUR HONOR, WE HAD RAISED ONE MORE 9 ISSUE IN OUR MOTION TO DISMISS AND THAT WAS SERVICE OF PROCESS 10 AS TO ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS WHO HAS ALLEGEDLY BEEN SERVED BY 11 RESIDES IN SHANGHAI. IF YOUR HONOR HAS ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT 12 THAT ARGUMENT, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS THEM. 13 I JUST WANT TO REITERATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS IN THE 14 PROCESS ALREADY OF FOLLOWING THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITH RESPECT 15 TO EVERY OTHER DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE THAT'S LOCATED IN 16 SHANGHAI --17 THE COURT: THIS IS WITH RESPECT TO MR. VIEGAS? 18 MS. ALBORZFAR: YES, YOUR HONOR. 19 THE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY HAS THE MEANS TO FOLLOW THE 20 REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION, HAS TWO SEPARATE CHINESE 21 LAW FIRMS THEY'VE HIRED AS LOCAL COUNSEL, AND THEY RAISED THE 22 ISSUE THAT MR. VIEGAS IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BUT THERE IS NO 23 AUTHORITY SUPPORTING THAT AS AN EXCUSE. 24 THE COURT: I LOOKED FOR THAT, AND I AGREE, MR. SONG.

I THINK YOU NEED TO, UNDER THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW, AND

WE TRIED TO TRACK IT DOWN ABOVE AND BEYOND YOUR BRIEFS, THAT
YOU STILL NEED TO FOLLOW THE HAGUE CONVENTION EVEN IF IT'S -IRRESPECTIVE OF IT'S A UNITED STATES CITIZEN IF THEY ARE
LIVING ABROAD, IT HAS TO BE FOLLOWED. THAT'S MY VIEW.

MR. SONG: I UNDERSTAND, YOUR HONOR.

I GUESS WE WEREN'T ARGUING THAT THE COURT ISSUE A
CATEGORICAL RULE THAT U.S. CITIZENS DON'T HAVE TO BE SERVED
WHEN THEY'RE RESIDING ABROAD, BUT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE WHERE MR. VIEGAS IS UNDISPUTEDLY A UNITED STATES
CITIZEN, HE HAS FILED TWO SEPARATE DECLARATIONS IN THIS
ACTION, IS CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS CASE AND HAS HIRED COUNSEL TO
REPRESENT HIM AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION, THAT IT
WOULD SERVE NO REAL PURPOSE, AND CERTAINLY NOT THE PURPOSES OF
THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO REQUIRE THE -- THAT THE HAGUE
CONVENTION PROCEDURES BE FOLLOWED IN THIS CASE.

MS. ALBORZFAR: IF I MAY BRIEFLY RESPOND.

ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S POSITION WOULD EFFECTIVELY

PENALIZE FOREIGN DEFENDANTS FROM GOING THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE

CHANNELS TO CHALLENGE SERVICE OF PROCESS WHEN IT'S NOT

EFFECTIVE BY RETAINING CALIFORNIA COUNSEL AND MAKING A SPECIAL

APPEARANCE TO CHALLENGE SERVICE.

THERE IS NO, AS YOUR HONOR NOTED, THERE IS SIMPLY NO

AUTHORITY SUPPORTING A FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE HAGUE CONVENTION,

AND THE PLAINTIFF IS DOING THAT WITH RESPECT TO EVERY OTHER

DEFENDANT. THERE'S NO BASIS TO MAKE MR. VIEGAS ANY EXCEPTION

TO THE RULE.

THE COURT: IS THERE AN ATTORNEY'S FEES PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT?

MS. ALBORZFAR: YES, YOUR HONOR.

MR. SONG: YES, I BELIEVE THERE IS.

THE COURT: WELL, I CAN ALWAYS AWARD YOU ALL OF YOUR ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR EVERYTHING THAT YOU'VE HAD TO GO THROUGH IF HE'S TRYING TO AVOID SERVICE BY FORCING THE ADDITIONAL TIME AND PROCEDURE.

MR. SONG: I WAS JUST INVOLVED IN THAT PROCESS, AND
IT IS A VERY INVOLVED PROCESS. WE RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM
THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE THAT THEY'VE ACCEPTED OUR
DOCUMENTS. NOW THEY NEED TO BE SENT TO THE CHINA PEOPLE'S
HIGH COURT. I'M SURE YOUR HONOR IS FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCESS,
BUT THERE ARE ABOUT FIVE DIFFERENT COURTS THAT HAVE TO LOOK AT
THESE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THEY ACTUALLY GET SENT TO THE
DEFENDANTS IN CHINA.

THE COURT: WELL, I WILL -- LET ME THINK ABOUT THAT

ONE, AND I WILL ISSUE A SEPARATE ORDER WITH RESPECT TO THAT

ONE. BUT I MIGHT BE INCLINED TO, ONCE YOU EFFECTUATE PROCESS

AND I HAVE HIM HERE, AWARD YOU ATTORNEY'S FEES IF HE CAN'T

GIVE ME A DECENT REASON FOR NOT AGREEING TO BE COOPERATIVE

WHEN HE'S A UNITED STATES CITIZEN.

MS. ALBORZFAR: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD NOTE THAT THIS
DISPUTE HAS BEEN A LONG TIME COMING. THE PLAINTIFF'S KNOWN

THERE WAS GOING TO BE A DISPUTE FOR A LONG TIME. THE PARTIES
WENT THROUGH MEDIATION NEGOTIATION AND SENT AROUND DRAFT
COMPLAINTS. THERE'S NO REASON WHY MR. VIEGAS COULDN'T HAVE
BEEN INCLUDED IN THE INITIAL PROCEDURES FOR SERVING THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS IN THE HAGUE CONVENTION. AND, IN FACT --

THE COURT: THAT ARGUMENT ACTUALLY CUTS THE OTHER WAY. IT DOESN'T HELP YOUR CLIENT.

MS. ALBORZFAR: IN TERMS OF THE COSTS, YOUR HONOR, IF
ALL OF THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED AT THE SAME TIME
LIKE THEY WERE REQUIRED TO BE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION, THAT
WOULD HAVE ALLEVIATED SOME OF THE CONCERNS.

THE COURT: IT DOESN'T HELP YOUR CLIENT. HE'S A

UNITED STATES CITIZEN. HE ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT THAT HAS A

TO FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN IT. IF HE WAS IN CALIFORNIA,

THIS WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE. IF HE WAS ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED

STATES, THIS WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE.

IF HE WANTS TO HIDE IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY WHEN HE KNOWS
THAT THERE'S A DISPUTE AND DOESN'T WANT TO ACCEPT SERVICE, I
WILL CONSIDER ATTORNEY'S FEES BEING AWARDED FOR THE COST OF
HAVING TO DO THIS WITH RESPECT TO HIM. AND YOU LET HIM KNOW
THAT.

MS. ALBORZFAR: I CERTAINLY WILL, YOUR HONOR. AND I UNDERSTAND. MY ONLY POINT IS THAT THE RULES ARE -- THE RULES HAVE BEEN PUT IN PLACE FOR A REASON, AND THERE IS NO EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. BUT I DO UNDERSTAND YOUR HONOR'S

POINT AND I WILL PASS IT ALONG, CERTAINLY. 1 2 THE COURT: THERE ARE TWO WAYS TO PLAY BALL. IF 3 THAT'S THE WAY HE WANTS TO PLAY, IT MAY COST HIM. ALL RIGHT. I'LL ISSUE AN ORDER ON THAT ONE. 4 5 MR. SONG: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY SPEAK JUST ONE MORE TIME. I PROMISE. JUST TWO POINTS. 6 7 SO IN EFFECTING SERVICE THROUGH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ARE 8 THE OTHER DEFENDANTS, THE COPIES OF THE SUMMONS AND THE 9 COMPLAINT WILL BE DELIVERED TO MR. VIEGAS BECAUSE SHANGHAI 10 MARCO WAS DISSOLVED, AND THAT'S -- MR. VIEGAS IS THE PERSON TO 11 WHOM WE SENT IT TO. 12 I WOULD ALSO ASK IF THE COURT IS INCLINED, THAT WE COULD 13 FILE A MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON MR. VIEGAS IF THE 14 COURT'S OPEN TO THAT. THAT WOULD BE AN ALTERNATIVE REQUEST SO 15 WE CAN AVOID THE DELAY AND COST OF HAVING --16 THE COURT: I HAVEN'T LOOKED ON THE LAW ON IT. 17 MR. SONG: GOT IT. OKAY. THE COURT: BUT I'M NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN 18 19 GAMESMANSHIP. I'M NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN INCREASING 20 THE COST OF LITIGATION, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE EOUITIES SUGGEST 21 THAT HE SHOULD ACCEPT SERVICE AND BE DONE WITH IT. 22 SO I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT MOTION WOULD LOOK LIKE SO I'M 23 NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU SOME KIND OF PRELIMINARY INDICATION. 24 THINK I'VE LET DEFENSE COUNSEL KNOW MY PERSPECTIVE ON THIS,

AND WHAT I THINK AS A BUSINESSMAN MR. VIEGAS SHOULD BE DOING,

1	PERIOD. ALL RIGHT?
2	WE ARE ADJOURNED.
3	MR. SONG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
4	MS. ALBORZFAR: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
5	(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 4:07 P.M.)
6	
7	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
8	I, DIANE E. SKILLMAN, OFFICIAL REPORTER FOR THE
9	UNITED STATES COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, HEREBY
10	CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE
11	RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.
12	
13	Disne E. Skilman
14	DIANE E. SKILLMAN, CSR 4909, RPR, FCRR
15	TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2016
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